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THE OPEN-END ENCUMBRANCE
DONALD M. LESHER of the Denver Bar
Although in recent years a great deal has been written and
said about open-end mortgages or deed of trust,1 the concept of
an encumbrance given for a sum of money advanced at the time
of the execution thereof, or to be advanced in the future, or both,
is not new. Attorneys and lenders are perhaps less familiar with
the rights of the parties where a future advance encumbrance is
used than in the normal mortgage relationship, because the open-
end encumbrance is in less frequent use. Those rights, however,
appear to be well established in Colorado, as well as in other parts
of the country; the mystery appears to be one of unfamiliarity
more than anything else.
Since 1812, when the case of Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch. 34,
3 L.Ed. 260, was decided, the validity of such encumbrances has
been generally upheld. 2 Various decisions have resulted in confu-
sion because of peculiar wording in the instrument involved in
the litigation; a few have followed the English theory that the
mortgagee, as legal title holder, has the right to retain title as
security. Occasionally jurisdictions have based their decisions on
local statutes,3 but even though the purpose is not so stated, it is
'For further discussion of this problem see Hiester, The Open End Mort-
gage, 28 DICTA 204 (1951) ; Ashley, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 31
N.C.L. REV. 504 (1953); Smith, Open End Mortgages, 2 PORTLAND U. L. REV. 19
(1952) ; LIFE, July 27, 1953, p. 61 (a pictorial illustration) ; 29 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733 (1953).
'Jones v. N. Y. Guaranty Co., 101 U. S. 622; In re Rosenbatt, 299 Fed. 771;
Eggleston v. Birmingham Trust, 277 Fed. 1015; In re Corbett, 248 Fed. 988;
Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48, 93 S. 704; Hendon v. Morris, 110 Ala. 106, 20 S.
27; Patterson v. Ogles, 152 Ark. 395, 238 S. W. 598; Vogan v. Caminetti, 65
Calif. 438, 4 P. 435; Am. Say. Bank v. Kemp, 21 Calif. App. 571, 132 P. 617;
DuBois v. Denver First Ntl. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908); Hubbard v.
Savage, 8 Conn. 215; Carrington v. Cit. Bank, 144 Ga. 52, 85 S. E. 1027; Weiser
L. & T. Co. v. Comberford, 238 P. 515; Freutel v. Schmits, 299 Ill. 320, 132 N.
E. 534; Good v. Woodruff, 208 Ill. App. 147; Bowen v. Ratcliff, 140 Ind. 393,
30 N. E. 860; Corn Belt Trust v. May, 197 Iowa 54, 196 N. W. 735; Allen v.
Fuget, 42 Kan. 672, 22 P. 725; Ky. Lum. Co. v. Ky. T. Say. Bank, 184 Ky. 244;
Merchants' Bank v. Hervey Plow, 14 S. 139; West. Nat. Bank v. Jenkins, 131
Md. 239, 101 A. 667; Taft v. Stoddard, 142 Mass. 545, 8 N. E. 586; Cit. Say. Bank
v. Kock, 117 Mich. 225, 75 N. W. 458; Madigan v. Mead, 31 Minn. 94, 16 N. W.
539; Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553; Raymond Nat. Bank v. Rabke, 72 Mont.
527, 235 P. 327; Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720, 46 N. W. 286; Reed v. Rochford,
62 N. J. Eq. 186, 50 A. 70; Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43; Merchants'
State Bank v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238; Berry-Beall Co. v. Francis, 104 Okla. 81, 230
P. 496; Nicklin v. Betts Sp. Co., 11 Ore. 406, 230 P. 496; Moats v. Thompson,
289 Pa. 313, 129 A. 105; Ex parte Am. Fertilizer Co., 122 S. C. 171; Vacuum Oil
Co. v. Liberty Ref. Co., 265 S. W. 749; Segman v. Darrow, 31 Vt. 122; Eltopia
Fin. Co. v. Colby, 126 Wash. 554, 219 P. 24.
1 New Hampshire has a statute (REV. ST. c. 131, §3) prohibiting optional
future advances, and has held mortgages providing for such advances are in-
valid. Staniels v. Whitcher, 72 N. H. 451, 57 A. 678.
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generally held that encumbrances for optional, additional advances
are valid,4 even as against creditors and subsequent purchasers,
and even though the amount be unlimited,5 and that such an ad-
vancement creates a lien prior to any intervening lien of which
the original mortgagee had no actual notice.
As is commonly the case, the rule of law is more readily stated
than applied. To arrive at a practical application of the general
rule of law, terminology must be defined; the rights (if other per-
sons-the trustee, the intervening lien owner-must be considered;
the lender is entitled to advice from his attorney which will pre-
vent litigation and which will, at the same time, answer practical,
competitve problems in a business-like manner.
The open-end encumbrance is becoming more and more com-
mon, not only in the financing of construction, 6 but also in the in-
demnifying of prospective endorsements, guarantees, and accommo-
dations of commercial paper, 7 as well as in the financing of improve-
ment and maintenance repairs and construction of residential prop-
erty. Through the device of the open-end encumbrance, the mort-
gagee has the advantage of extending additional credit as the
value of the security increases, and of maintaining an additional
outlet for available funds without the necessity of the expenses
incident to additional loans.8 The mortgagor has the obvious ad-
vantage of obtaining additional funds at low interest rates and
under long-term amortization schedules. In addition, the mort-
gagor avoids problems resulting from frequent title examinations,
refinancing, or the alternative of second or third mortgages. 9 By
means of the open-end encumbrance, additional moneys may be
advanced by the mortgagee, to be secured by the original encum-
IDubois v. First NatI. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908); Dummer v.
Smedley, 110 Mich. 466, 68 N. W. 260; Reeves v. Evans, 34 A. 477 (N. J. Eq.).
See also: Ferguson v. Mueller, 115 Colo. 139, 169 P. (2d) 610 (1946) ; and 1
Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed. Sec. 461).
'United States v. Hoos, 3 Cranch 73; Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48; Hamil-
ton v. Rhodes, 72 Ark. 625; Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Calif. 383, 19 P. 641; Davis
v. Carlisle, 5 Ind. Terr. 83; Union State Bank v. Chapman, 124 Kan. 315;
Bunker v. Barron, 93 Mo. 87; Cit. Say. Bank v. Rock, 117 Mich. 225; Candler
v. Cromwell, 101 Miss. 161, 57 S. 554; Rice Bros. v. Davis, 99 Mo. App. 636,
74 S. W. 431; Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720, 46 N. W. 286; Chartz v. Cardelli,
(Nev.) 270 P. 761; First Nat. Bank v. Byard, 26 N. J. Eq. 255; Cooan v. Bosque
Bonita Land Co., (N. M.) 42 P. 77; Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380; Paschal
v. Bohannan, 59 Okla. 139, 158 P. 365; Moats v. Thompson, 283 Pa. 313, 129 A.
105; Ex Parte Am. Fertilizer Co., 122 S. C. 171; Klein v. Glass, 53 Tex. 37;
Lamoille County Sav. Bank v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535; Alexandria Sav. Inst. v.
Thomas, (Va.) 29 Gratt 483; Carey v. Herrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 P. 190.
'New Baltimore Loan & Savings Ass'n v. Tracey, 142 Md. 211, 120 A. 441
(1923); Tripp v. Babcock, 195 Mass. 1, 80 N. E. 593 (1907).
'Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380 (1860).
'An informative series of articles discussing the advantages and procedures
involved in open-end mortgages was published intermittently in House &
Home, July, 1952-Dec., 1953.
965 HARV. LAW REV. 478 (1952).
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brance, as the need arises, as the parties agree, or in accordance
with original commitments.
These encumbrances have generally been classified as either
optional or obligatory. An obligatory open-end encumbrance is
one under which the mortgagee has agreed in advance to loan the
additional funds or one under which the mortgagee can elect to
make an advancement or an expenditure upon the security prop-
erty without the conse'at or approval of the mortgagor. In the
latter group will fall such advancements as the payment of taxes,
maintenance of the security to prevent waste, and the like. In
the former group will be the customary construction loan, under
the terms of which the mortgagee agrees, at the time of the orik-
inal instrument, to advance the sums of money, within the limits
specified in said instrument, as the construction progresses.
There is little or no doubt concerning the priority of the lien
resulting from each advancement under an obligatory open-end
encumbrance. It is, almost without question, held that such lien
relates back to the lien of the original encumbrance, even though
other liens have intervened and the mortgagor has knowledge 6f
such intervening lien.' 0
A large portion of the texts and legal publication articles on
the subject have concerned themselves with the priority of the
lien of these obligatory open-end encumbrances and have paid lit-
tle or no attention to the priority of liens for advancements made
under optional open-end encumbrances. The most acute problems,
however, exist in the use of optional open-end encumbrances.
If an encumbrance on its face purports to secure not only the
sum originally advanced but also additional amounts, with or with-
out limit, as may be agreed upon by both parties from time tb
time in the future, does such an encumbrance or an advance made
thereunder create a valid lien? What is the priority of such lien-
or liens? What is the effect of such an instrument on third parties
claiming subsequent liens? Is the original mortgagee protected?
Can the intervening lienor protect his rights? Upon whom is
placed the obligation-the original mortgagee or the intervening
lienor-to give notice of additional money advancements? What
are the duties of the trustee upon release of the encumbrance, or
upon foreclosure?
".New Orleans Bank Assn. v. LeBreton, 120 U. S. 765; Schiffer v. Feagin,
51 Ala. 335; Keese v. Boardsley, 190 Calif. 465, 213 P. 500; Weissman v. Volimo,
84 Conn. 326, 80 A. 81; Good v. Woodruff, 208 Ill. App. 147; Belle Plaine Bank
v. May, 197 Iowa 54, 196 N. W. 735; Nelson v. Royce, (Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh 401,
23 Am. Dec. 411; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494; Gerrity v. Wareham Bank,
202 Mass. 156; Erickson v. Ireland, 134 Minn. 156; Sumers v. Roos, 42 Miss.
749; Creigh v. Jones, 103 Neb. 706; Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Hyman
v. Hauff, 138 N. Y. 48; Land Title Co. v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213; Smith v.
Smith, 33 S. C. 210; Colquhoun v. Atkinson, 20 Va. 550; McCarty v. Chalfant,
14 W. Va. 531; Wis. Planing Mill Co. v. Schuda, 72 Wis. 277; In re O'Byrne,
L. R. 15 Ir. 373; Pierce v. Canada Co., 25 Ont. 671.
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Such an encumbrance, where moneys beyond, or in addition
to, the amount of the original indebtedness (less amortization pay-
ments) may be secured, if and when such moneys are advanced,
is an optional open-end encumbrance." The. amount of the ad-
vancements may be limited by the original instrument or no limit
whatsoever may be expressed.' 2 Advancements may be evidenced
by additional notes or other instruments, or appropriate wording
in the original note may include such advancements. 13 The ad-
vancements may result in a total indebtedness far in excess of
that stated in the original note, or such advancements may be lim-
ited by agreement, or otherwise, to the original indebtedness.
14
If the mortgagee has bound himself in advance by agreement
to lend future sums, or if the mortgagee can elect to make an
advancement or an expenditure upon the security property with-
out the consent or the approval of the mortgagor, it is not an
optional advance . . . but is an obligatory advance. The optional
open-end encumbrance is most commonly in use in residential
financing because of its adaptability to the needs of the home-
owner who makes conscientious efforts to maintain and increase
the value of his property. 15
Although some question may be raised as to the negotiability
of the promissory note which permits additional advances under
the original instrument, there can be no question that such a note
would be at least transferable.
Three Colorado cases seem to express the prevailing law as
to the validity of the open-end encumbrance and as to the priority
of the lien of the additional advance.
In Ferguson v. Mueller, 115 Colo. 139, 169 P. (2d) 610 (1946),
the Court said:
No question is made concerning the validity of the
mortgage to cover future advances and it is now well set-
tled that the mortgage need not state on its face that such
was its purpose.
In the early Colorado case of Joralmon v. McFee, 31 Colo. 26,
"138 A. L. R_ 579.
"81 A. L. R. 631.
"3 The following wording in the original note appears to be sufficient:
For value received, we promise to pay to the order of ............................
the sum of $ ................ and such additional sums as may be advanced
hereunder, at the option of the holders hereof, to the makers or their
successors in title.
11 Connecticut has held that mortgages for unlimited future advances are
invalid as to creditors. Pettibone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158; Welch v. Chaffee,
73 Conn. 318.
" Where advances are to be made only to a certain amount or within a cer-
tain period, loans in excess of the amount or after expiration of the period are
not entitled to priority. When the advances are an obligation on the mortgages,
the mortgage takes effect immediately upon its execution. Atkinson v. Foote,
44 Cal. App. 149; Kohn v. Southern Ohio Loan and Trust Co., 101 Ohio 34;
In re Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 372.
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71 P. 419 (1903), the Court upheld the validity of open-end en-
cumbrances, and in DuBois v. First National Bank, 43 Colo. 400,
96 P. 169 (1908), the Court had before it the question of the
priority of an advance made under an open-end encumbrance over
an intervening good faith purchaser. The Court adopted the theory
of the law advanced by the mortgagee, which was stated as follows:
The position of the bank is that until she (the inter-
vening good faith purchaser) gave to it actual notice of
the acquisition of her interest in the property, it might
continue to make advances to the mortgagor even after
the maturity of the mortgage notes, since the mortgage
did not restrict the time within which the advances were
to be made, which would be protected by the mortgage as
to the entire property.
and found that all the advances which the bank made to DuBois
were made before defendant gave notice of her rights, and were,
therefore, prior to such rights.
It would seem, therefore, that, in Colorado, optional advances
made under an open-end encumbrance are within the lien of the
original encumbrance if, at the time of such advance, the mort-
gagee had no actual notice of the intervention of other liens or
claimants.
The DuBois case, never having been overruled, remains as
the present law on the priority of the lien of advances made under
optional open-end encumbrances. The lien of such advance relates
back to the time of the original encumbrance, unless intervening
lienors or claimants have given notice to the mortgagee of their
intervening rights.1
6
The recording acts are meant to give reasonable notice to
subsequent creditors and purchasers concerning the credits which
have been or may be advanced and the purpose of or security for
the contract. The Mississippi case of Witczinski v. Everman 17 is
representative of opinions which state that even though no upper
limit is stated in the mortgage, the fact of recordation itself puts
subsequent parties on inquiry as to the state of dealings between
the parties. Although there is some authority for the premise
that the recording of a subsequent encumbrance puts the original
"e Davis v. Carlisle, 142 Fed. 196; Reidy v. Collins, 26 P. (2d) 712; Boswell
v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74; Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 Ill. 367; Brinkmeyer v.
Browneller, 55 Ind. 487; Nelson v. Boyce, (Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh 401; Gray v.
McClellan, 214 Mass. 92; Finlayson v. Crooks, 47 Minn. 74; Chartz v. Cardelli,
(Nev.) 271 P. 761; Peaslee v. Evans, (N. H.) 132 A. 448; Micele v. Falduti,
(N. J.) 137 A. 92; Catskill Nat. Bank v. Saxe, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 82; U. S. Nat.
Bank v. Embody, (Ore.) 25 P. (2d) 149; Nat. Bank v. Gunhouse, 17 S. C. 489;
McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 4; Alexandria Say. Inst. v. Thomas, 29 Gratt (70
Va.) 483; Cisco Banking Co. v. Keystone Pipe Co., (Tex.) 277 S. W. 1060; El-
topia Fin. Co. v. Colby, 126 Wash. 554; Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69
W. Va. 671.
151 Miss. 841 (1876).
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mortgagee on notice of the rights of such intervening lienor, it
is generally held that recording the junior lien does not consti-
tute notice to the mortgagee who advanced the sums under the
mortgage.1 8 The intervening lien must be recorded to have any
claim, but the recording act does not work upwards to prior-
recorded liens.
A majority of the jurisdictions, as well as England, Canada,
and Ireland, have held that where the advance is optional the
intervening liens are not superior thereto unless the advance is
made with actual notice or knowledge of the intervening encum-
brance. Constructive notice is not sufficient, in most jurisdictions,
to prevent the lien of the additional advance from relating back
to the priority of the original encumbrance. 19
Under date of April 28, 1954, the Public Trustee of the Cfty
and County of Denver has issued a statement of policy with refer-
ence to the releasing and foreclosing of open-end deeds of trust.
"SWitczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v.
Dunn, 10 Wash. (2d) 29, 116 P. (2d) 253 (1941). 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE, §1199 (5th Ed., 1941):
When a mortgage to secure future advances reasonably states the
purposes for which it is given, its record is a constructive notice to sub-
sequent purchasers and encumbrancers; they are thereby put upon an
inquiry to ascertain what advances or liabilities have been made or
incurred. The record of a subsequent mortgage or conveyance, or the
docketing Of a subsequent judgment, is not a constructive notice of its
existence to such prior mortgagee. The prior mortgage, therefore, duly
recorded, has a preference over subsequent recorded mortgages or con-
veyances, or subsequent docketed judgments, not only for advanced
previously made, but also for advances made after their recording or
docketing without notice thereof.
19The majority doctrine discussed above is further clarified and enlarged
upon by Leonard A. Jones, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional
Sales, (6th Ed., 1933), as follows:
Generally the amount intended to be advanced need not be stated,
provided it can be otherwise ascertained by the description. But even
where limitation is necessary in order to constitute a continuing se-
curity, which will not be affected by subsequent conveyances, a recorded
mortgage for an unlimited sum is notice to a subsequent encumbrancer
as to all sums advanced upon the mortgage before the subsequent lien
attaches. Moreover, the record of the subsequent mortgage is no notice
to such prior mortgagee, that any subsequent lien has attached. A
subsequent mortgagee can limit the credit that may be safely given
under the mortgage for future advances only by giving the holder of
it express notice of his lien, and a notice also that he must make no
future advances on the credit of that mortgage. The mortgage will
then stand as security for the real equitable claims of the mortgagee,
whether they existed at the date of the mortgage or arose afterward,
but prior to the receipt of such notice. If such mortgagee is not under
any obligation to make advances, and after notice of a subsequent
mortgage does make further advances, to the extent of such advances
the subsequent mortgagee has the right of precedence. But if such
mortgagee is under obligation to make the advances, he is entitled to
the security, whatever may be the encumbrances subsequently made
upon the property, and whether he has notice of them or not.
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Because the Public Trustee, by statute, is obligated to determine
that the entire indebtedness has been paid in full and because the
priority of the lien of advancements made under open-end encum-
brances is dependent upon the knowledge and notice of the par-
ties, 20 the Public Trustee does not feel that he should be placed
in a position of determining the rights acquired under an im-
properly worded open-end encumbrance. Accordingly, the Public
Trustee of the City and County of Denver has stated that he will
release any open-end deed of trust without requiring bond only
if the deed of trust shows on its face a method by which the pub-
lic Trustee can determine with certainty, at the time the release
is requested, that the person, association, or corporation signing
the request is the holder of all obligations secured by the deed of
trust, including the original loan at the time of execution, and
all subsequent loans or advances, if any; or if the deed of trusf
contains on its face authorization to the Public Trustee to release
the deed of trust upon receipt of the original note, duly cancelled,
without inquiry concerning subsequent loans or advances.
The Public Trustee has suggested certain forms of deeds of
,trust which may be used as open-end encumbrances. Of these, the
following provision appears to be the simplest:
This deed of trust secures not only the indebtedness
evidenced by the promissory note above described, but
also any additional indebtedness that may hereafter be
incurred by the debtor, his or their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators, successors or assigns, to the beneficiary;
provided, however, if the debtor, his heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns shall hereafter exhibit said
above described note, duly cancelled, to the public trus-
tee with a written request for the release of this deed of
trust containing a statement that the entire indebtedness
secured hereby has been fully paid, the public trustee may
release this deed of trust without further showing as to
the additional indebtedness and without liability for so
doing.
The Public Trustee also has specifically approved the following
language:
And whereas, said note provides for additional ad-
vances at the option of the said Mortgagee, it is specifi-
cally agreed that said advances shall be a part of the prin-
cipal indebtedness, that all of the covenants and agree-
ments evidencing such advances shall be a part hereof,
and that this deed of trust shall secure, in addition to
"The Public Trustee of Denver has prepared a complete statement of
policy, as well as approved provisions to be used in open-end deeds of trust,
all of which are available on request.
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the original indebtedness, any additional advances made
by said Mortgagee to the makers or their successors in
title. The public trustee may, upon the production of said
note, duly cancelled, release this deed of trust without
further showing as to said additional advances and with-
out liability for so doing; such release shall also consti-
tute a release of the lien for any such advancements.
Although the above provisions have been approved by the
Denver Public Trustee, it is recommended that the specific pro-
visions to be included in the encumbrance of any lender, if vary-
ing in substance from said provisions, be submitted to the Public
Trustee for his prior approval. Other forms have also been ap-
proved, any one of which may more adequately meet the needs
of the particular lender.
It is further suggested that, at the time of the release of an
open-end encumbrance, the request for release state as follows:
"Please execute this release; the indebtedness, together with all
additional advances, if any, secured by the above-mentioned deed
of trust, having been fully paid."
If the above-quoted phrases, or others approved by the Public
Trustee, are incorporated in open-end deeds of trust, no question
will be raised by the Public Trustee upon the release of said in-
strument. The Public Trustee has requested that all additional
advances be endorsed upon the original promissory note, or be
evidenced by additional agreements or notes. Such additional
notes, if any, must, of course, be surrendered to the Public Trustee
at the time of the release of the encumbrance.
Whether or not the abstract is to be recertified by the mort-
gagee at the time of making an additional advance is a matter
of business policy to be determined by the mortgagee. It is felt
that, as a practical matter, better practice would be for the mort-
gagee to take whatever steps may be necessary to determine the
existence of intervening lienors or title holders. In the event that
such intervening lien appears, the mortgagee can well insist that
the holder of such intervening lien execute a consent and subroga-
tion agreement before the additional advancement is made.2 1 In
this manner, no question can be raised concerning the priority of
the lien of the additional advance. In the event, however, that
the additional advance is made without knowledge of such lien
or without the subrogation agreement I have referred to, it is rec-
ommended that the open-end encumbrances be foreclosed through
the courts rather than the Public Trustee, so that the rights of
all parties in the proceeds of the sale can be determined in advance,
in one proceeding.
"Where the intervening lien is expressly made subject to the mortgage
for future advances, it would seem to follow that the advances constitute a




It has been suggested that legislation be adopted to clarify
the Colorado law concerning open-end encumbrances. In the opin-
ion of the writer, such legislation is, at the present time, not neces-
sary. The distinction between obligatory and optional open-end
encumbrances has been made certain by court decision. The rights
of the mortgagee under an optional open-end encumbrance are
well settled, and an intervening lienor can easily protect his rights
by ascertaining the total amount advanced under the prior en-
cumbrance and by giving immediate actual notice to the mort-
gagee of his interest. It seems, therefore, that any statute would
only complicate an already well-established rule of law and would
afford no additional protection to any of the parties.
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES
June 30-July 3, 1954, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Broadmoor Hotel
Honorable Phillip G. Gilliam, President, Presiding
Speakers will include Governor Dan Thornton, Judge William
McKesson of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court, and the Honorable
Mortimer Stone, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Some of the topics to be discussed are:
1. The control of obscene literature and horror comics, now
being studied by the U. S. Senate Committee on Juvenile Delin-
quency.
2. Standards for specialized Courts dealing with children.
3. Newspaper publicity given to juveniles before the Court.
4. Young men entering the armed services with juvenile court
records.
5. Interstate Compact relating to runaway children.
6. Punishment of parents who contribute to the delinquency
of children.
7. The rights of children.
8. A review of the important judical decisions during the
past year.
Entertainment will include cocktail parties and scenic trips.
Further information regarding arrangements may be obtained
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ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE TENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
July 12-14, 1954-Estes Park, Colorado-Stanley Hotel
Members of the Bar are cordially invited to attend
PROGRAM
MONDAY, JULY 12, 1954
HONORABLE ORIE L. PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, Presiding
9:30 A.M.-Address of Welcome, HARRY S. PETERSEN, President,
Colorado Bar Association.
Introduction of the new Judges of the Tenth Circuit.
HONORABLE ALFRED P. MURRAH, United States Circuit Judge,
Presiding
9:45 A.M.-Law Science Day. The program for Law Science Day
was organized and is conducted by DR. HUBERT WINSTON
SMITH, Director of the Law-Science Institute at the Univer-
sity of Texas, Austin, Texas, with the assistance of members
of the Bar.
I. Medicolegal Trial Technique in the Handling of Head Injury
Cases.
Speakers: DR. HUBERT WINSTON SMITH, Professor of Law
and Legal Medicine, Director of the Law-Science Institute at
the University of Texas; DR. F. KEITH BRADFORD, Professor
of Neurosurgery, Baylor Medical College, Houston Texas (fre-
quent lecturer in the Law Science Short Courses and author
with Spurling of "The Intervertebral Disc").
The speakers will endeavor to reveal the main essentials involved
in various types of head injuries, the immediate and long
range disabilities which may result, and the chief problems
of investigation and proof which will confront plaintiffs' and
defendants' counsel, as well as techniques which may be used
by each in proper handling of the scientific evidence.
Recess for luncheon 12:30 P.M. Reconvene 1:30 P.M.
II. Preparation and Trial of a Personal Injury Case.
Preparation and Trial of a Personal Injury Case by the Plain-
tiff-il:30 to 2:10 P.M. TRUMAN B. RUCKER, Esq., Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
Preparation and Trial of a Personal Injury Case by the Defend-
ant-2:10 to 2:50 P.M. DUKE DUVALL, Esq., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma.
Ten Minute Recess.
(2:30 P.M.-Bridge and Canasta Party for the ladies, followed by
tea at 4:30 P.M.)
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III. The Post-Mortem Examination in Cases of Suspected
Traumatic Injury.
Speaker: DR. R. H. RIGDON, Professor of Pathology, University
of Texas, Galveston, Texas-3:00 to 3:40 P.M.
IV. Philosophy and Practice of the Pre-Trial Conference. (Law-
yers who will participate will be announced.)
A. Part 1-3:40 to 4:05 P.M.
B. Part 2-4:05 to 4:30 P.M.
V. Trial of a case of Cancer Allegedly Caused or Aggravated
by Trauma. (Outstanding trial counsel carry distinguished
physicians through direct and cross-examination to reveal the
main problems involving alleged causation or aggravation of
cancer by trauma. Expert witnesses also demonstrate their
techniques of handling themselves on the witness stand.)
Trial Judge: One of the Federal District Judges who will be in
attendance.
For Plaintiff: Expert witness-DR. R. H. RIGDON, Galveston,
Texas.
For Defendant: Expert witness-Cancer expert to be invited
from Denver.
(Lawyers who will participate will be announced.)
9:00 P.M.-Square dancing.
TUESDAY, JULY 13, 1954
HONORABLE JOHN C. PICKETT, United States Circuit Judge,
Presiding
9:30 A.M.-"The Internal Revenue Code of 1954," STEPHEN H.
HART, Esq., Denver, Colorado, and CLAUDE M. MAER, JR., Esq.,
Denver, Colorado, members of the Colorado Bar.
10:15 A.M.-Ten-minute Recess.
10:25 A.M.-"The Internal Revenue Code of 1954" (continued).
11:15 A.M.-Address, "The Taxpayer's Constitutional Privileges
in Income Tax Investigations," ALBERT J. GOULD, Esq., Den-
ver, Colorado, member of the Colorado Bar.
12:30 P.M.-Recess. (Buffet Luncheon and Fashion Show at the
Pool for the ladies.)
HONORABLE SAM G. BRATTON, United States Circuit Judge,
Presiding
2:00 P.M.-"Cost of Reproducing the Record on Appeal-The Off-
set Duplication Method," HONORABLE WILL SHAFROTH, Chief,
Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D. C.
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2:30 P.M.-"The Use of the Offset Duplication Method in the
Tenth Circuit," ROBERT B. CARTWRIGHT, Clerk, Court of Ap-
peals, Tenth Circuit.
Note: Mr. Cartwright will present a plan for using the Offset
Duplication Method in the Tenth Circuit and at the same
time effecting an abridgment of the formal record and the
trial proceedings as now practiced in the Tenth Circuit.
Discussion.
3:15 P.M.-"Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure," LELAND L. TOLMAN, Chief of Business Administra-
tion, Adlministrative Office of the United States Courts, Wash-
ington, D. C., and member of the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7:00 P.M.-Banquet.
Speaker: The HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS, Deputy Attorney
General of the United States.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 1954
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. MELLOTT, United States District Judge,
District of Kansas, Presiding
9:30 A.M.-Panel Discussion-Effectiveness of the Jury System
in the Tenth Circuit, Including Preliminary Report of Re-
sults of Juror Surveys and Suggested Changes in Procedure,
If Any.
PAUL R. KITCH, Esq., Panel Leader; GEORGE STALLWITZ, Esq.;
GEORGE POWERS, Esq.; GEORGE SPRADLING, Esq.; WAYNE
COULSON, Esq.; WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, Esq., all of Wichita,
Kansas, and members of the Kansas Bar; DOUGLAS A. HUDSON,
Esq., Fort Scott, Kansas, member of the Kansas Bar.; KEN-
NETH W. ROBINSON, Esq., Denver, Colorado, member of the
Colorado Bar.
Address, "Probation and Parole from the Viewpoint of the Trial
Judge," HONORABLE EDGAR S. VAUGHT, Chief Judge, United
States District Court, Western District of Oklahoma.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
HONORABLE ORIE L. PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, Presiding
Reports of Committees.
Resolutions adopted at the annual meeting of the Federal Court
Clerks Association in Denver, Colorado, August 10, 1953.
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BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT IN
AN OIL AND GAS LEASE
KEN E. BODINE *
Petroleum Engineer, Prairie States Oil Co.
Time and education have effected constant changes upon the
interpretation of the law. The implied covenants in oil and gas
law have been changing color in the eyes of the courts ever since
1859, when Colonel Drake's spring brought forth black mud in-
stead of salt water for his livestock. It is the hope of the author
that this article will serve, not to predict Colorado decision, but
rather to point out some of the significant factors to be considered
by the lawyer in his approach to the implied covenant of modern
day oil and gas law.
WHAT ARE IMPLIED COVENANTS'
The production of petroleum is unique from most types of
business in that it is but rarely performed by the party with the
original right to do so. The need for specialized equipment and
technical knowledge compels the land owner to seek an agreement
with a party of these technical qualifications, generally known as
an operator. The exclusive right to explore for, exploit, and
market petroleum is granted to the operator, in return for which
the land owner generally provides himself with remuneration in
such forms as rent on the property, bonus for the execution of
lease, and a percentage royalty of the proceeds from the sale of
production.
The contract medium through which this agreement is ef-
fected is an oil and gas lease. Though not germane to the imme-
diate discussion, it should be mentioned that the courts of Texas
today view this instrument as a deed creating a determinable fee
simple estate. 2 Notwithstanding the various opinions as to the
interests, corporeal or incorporeal, created by the different types
of granting clauses in the lease, it is generally conceded that the
interest of the so-called lessee or operator is an interest in land
subject to the recording acts, Statute of Frauds,3 and the home-
stead acts.
4
The early leases and, to a great extent, those of today contain
no express covenants as to specific methods of development and
lease operation to which the lessee must adhere. Nor would it be
practical to agree in advance on a specific method for the develop-
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
2Merrill, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2nd Edition 1940);
Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (2nd Edition 1938), Sec. 391, et seq.; Thorn-
ton, OIL AND GAS-WILLIS' (5th Edition), Sec. 503, et seq.
I Walker, Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease;
7 TEX. LAW REV. 554.
'Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan. 842, 171 P. 1155.
'Carter Oil Co. v. Popp, 70 OkI. 232, 174 P. 747.
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ment of such uncertainties as subsurface oil and gas structures.
The courts recognized this practical reason for the absence of ex-
press covenants, and as a result invoked equity upon the lessee to
proceed with the diligence and care of a reasonably prudent op-
erator. The lessor had granted away his legal right to develop
the land, hence it seemed only fair that his remaining equitable
interest should be given some protection. From this obligation
there evolved a set of implied promises, more commonly known
today as the implied covenants of the oil and gas lease. It has
become customary to speak of these covenants as independent or
separate obligations, but in reality they are simply part of the
overall duty of the lessee, namely, to conduct operations as would
a reasonably prudent operator.5 Stated briefly there are five
implied promises incumbent on the lessee in an oil and gas lease:
I. To drill an exploratory well.
II. To develop the premises with reasonable diligence after
the discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities.
III. To operate the lease prudently.
IV. To market the product promptly.
V. To protect the premises against substantial drainage.
It must always be remembered that the foregoing implied
covenants are necessary contributions by the courts and serve as
an interpretation of the intention of parties who have remained
silent on the subject of the implied covenant. Since impled coven-
ants arise from necessity and from the absence of express coven-
ants, it is obvious that the parties can avoid the implication of a
particular covenant by express agreement. 6 For example, the first
of the implied covenants, to drill, is practically extinct today, be-
cause the modern lease has expressly excluded any implication to
drill during the primary term. The lessee generally has an elec-
tion to drill or pay delay rentals to the lessor during the primary
term of the lease. In like manner, the scope of the other implied
covenants has been limited by such express provisions as the
"shut in" clause in the marketing of gas, the designation of a
certain depth formation from which production is sought, and
definite footage limits from the edge of premises to determine
lessee's duty of offset, regardless of drainage. However, for the
purpose of this discussion, the implied covenants will be examined
as if the lease contained no express covenants of limitation.
The remainder of this article will be devoted to the examina-
tion of the covenants with regard to the rights and duties aris-
ing under such covenants and to the remedies for breach of the
same.
I. To DRILL FOR AN EXPLORATORY WELL
The early leases were generally given for a specific period of
Davis v. Riddle, 25 Colo. 162, 136 P. 551 (1913).
' Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 487, 103 S. W. (2d) 965.
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time with no provisions for mandatory exploration or lease re-
newal. This was fair neither to the lessor who had granted away
his right to explore, nor to the lessee who might have made a dis-
covery after heavy exploration cost only to lose it on termination
day of the lease. The courts therefore imposed an obligation on
the lessee to drill an exploratory well within a reasonable time
after the lease had been executed 7 or suffer damages and even
possible forfeiture if damages proved inadequate. This resulted
in a sequence of clauses being inserted in the lease imposing duties
on the giving various rights to the parties. These included the
"thereafter" clause, the "drill or pay" clause, and the "unless"
clause. The end product of this sequence is our present day
"habendum" clause with a limitation in the form of an "unless"
clause:
A. The "Habendum" Clause
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same (subject to the other
provisions herein contained) for a term of ten years from
this date (called the "primary term") and as long there-
after as oil or gas or casinghead gas or either or any of
them, is produced therefrom; or as much longer thereafter
as the lessee in good faith shall conduct drilling operations
thereon and, should production result from such operations,
this lease shall remain in full force and effect as long as
oil or gas or casinghead gas, shall be produced therefrom.
B. The "Unless" Clause
If operations for the drilling of a well for oil or gas are
not commenced on said land on or before one year from
this date, this lease shall terminate as to both parties,
unless the lessee shall, on or before one year from this
date, pay or tender to the lessor or for the lessor's credit
in ------------------- bank at ---------------- or its successor or suc-
cessors, which bank and its successors are lessor's agent
and shall continue as depository regardless of changes in
ownership of the land, the sum of -----_ ---------- dollars which
shall operate as a rental and cover the privileges of de-
ferring the commencement of operations for the drilling
of a well one year from said date. In like manner and
upon like payments or tenders the commencement of oper-
ations for the drilling of a well may be further deferred
for like periods successively during the primary term of
this lease. And it is understood and agreed that the con-
sideration first recited herein, the down payment, covers
not only the privileges granted to the date when said
rental is payable as aforesaid, but also the lessee's option
of extending that period as aforesaid, and any and all other
rights conferred. All payments or tenders may be made
by check or draft of lessee or any assignee thereof, mailed
or delivered on or before the rental paying date.
'Davis v. Riddle, supra, note 5.
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The effect of the "unless" clause is to provide for an auto-
matic termination of the lease earlier than is provided for in the
"habendum" clause. Its wording is such that if the well is not
commenced and if rental is not paid as provided, the lease ipso
facto terminates.
The "drill or pay" type clause, although not in common use
today, should be noted for the reason that the federal oil and gas
lease forms operate substantially on the same principal. The
primary difference between the "unless" and "drill or pay" type
lease is that in the latter an affirmative act is required of the
lessee to drill, pay, or surrender the lease. The "unless" form, as
stated before, terminates ipso facto without such affirmative action.
The effect, as a practical matter in today's lease, is to exclude
any implication on the lessee to drill an exploratory well during
the primary term.
II. To DEVELOP PREMISES WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE AFTER
THE DISCOVERY OF OIL OR GAS IN PAYING QUANTITIES
It should be noted that the term "paying quantities" has two
separate and distinct uses in oil and gas law. As used here in con-
nection with the implied covenant, it means that oil and gas must
be found in such paying quantities that an ordinarily prudent
person, experienced in the business of oil and gas production,
would, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances,
expect a reasonable profit over and above the entire cost of drill-
ing, equipping, and operating the well or wells drilled.8 On the
other hand, where the term "paying quantities" is used in the
habendum clause to express a condition precedent upon which the
lease may continue, it is uniformly interpreted as requiring pro-
duction in such quantities as will pay a small profit over the cost
of operation of the well, although the cost of drilling may never
be repaid, and the operation as a whole result in a loss to the
lessee. 9
Once production in paying quantities has been found, the
delay rental clauses generally become inoperative and the lessee
must satisfy the requirements of this covenant. This means drill-
ing additional wells and performing all other functions which an
ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances would per-
form in order to fully develop the lease with regard for the best
interests of both lessee and lessor. 10 If production ceases before
the end of the primary term, the lessee generally has an option to
resume delay rentals or proceed with drilling operations in order
to maintain the lease. Whether a lease has been reasonably de-
veloped is a matter of fact depending on the surrounding circum-
stances, both economical and physical.
'Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carroll, 164 Ind. 526, 73 N. E. 1084.
Pine v. Webster, 118 Okla. 12, 246 P. 429.
10 Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S. W. (2d) 1031.
DICTA
June, 1954
Remedies for breach of the implied covenant to develop with
reasonable diligence
A. Damages
The general remedy for breach of the lessee's duty to develop
the premises is an action at law for damages. The principal ob-
jection to such an action is the difficulty in proving damages. Al-
though such uncertainty would probably entitle the lessor to an
equitable remedy, it does not prevent him from seeking his remedy
at law if he so elects. In Daughetee v. Ohio Co., "I the court said:
The rule is, that while the law will not permit wit-
nesses to speculate or conjecture as to possible or prob-
able damages, still the best evidence of which the sub-
ject will admit is receivable, and this is often nothing
better than the opinion of well-informed persons upon
the subject under investigation.
1. Burden of proof
The lessor who alleges the breach has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of evidence that a specific
amount of damages, usually in form of royalties, was in-
curred as a proximate result of the failure of the lessee
to drill wells or perform other functions necessary for the
reasonable development of the property.
2. Measure of damages
The measure of damages for breach of this implied
covenant is generally the value of royalties which the
lessor would have received if the lessee had complied with
the obligation, less the value of royalties actually paid,
plus interest at a legal rate on the unpaid royalties from
the time they would have accrued.
B. Conditional decree of cancellation
Where an action at law for damages furnishes an inadequate
remedy for any reason, the courts in the exercise of equity juris-
diction may, in one decree, order specific performance of the les-
see's implied duties, and in the alternative, cancellation of the
entire lease or any part thereof for failure to perform the order
of the court. The action of the court in granting such relief in
this class of cases is usually bottomed on three propositions, namely,
the reluctance of equity to enforce forfeitures, the adequacy or
inadequancy of legal remedies, and fraud in the performance of
the contract.
III. To OPERATE THE LEASE PRUDENTLY
What is prudent operation? The interpretation of this cov-
enant changes daily with the technical advances in petroleum pro-
1263 Ill. 518v 105 N. E. 308.
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duction. What would have been an acceptable method of operation
twenty years ago might be rejected completely today. Modern
equipment, subsurface knowledge, special service companies, uniti-
zation plans, secondary recovery programs, and many other fac-
tors spell out a new definition of prudent operation each day. It
is here that the courts must rely on the technical opinion of expert
witnesses in the fields of geology, petroleum production, and con-
servation of natural resources. The growing import of technical
evidence in cases of this type has also been recognized by the
lawyer, and more will be said later concerning the role of the
lawyer in preparing an engineer witness for trial.
Remedies for breach of implied covenant to operate prudently
Again the general rule of damages for breach of covenant
applies, with equitable relief available in form of a conditional
decree if damages prove inadequate.
IV. To MARKET THE PRODUCT PROMPTLY
The other covenants would be of little value to the lessor if
the lessee were allowed to cap the wells and refuse to market the
product. Hence the courts have imposed a duty on the lessee to mar-
ket the product as promptly as possible. Here again, however, just
as in the case of "paying quantities" in the covenant to develop, and
"prudent operation" in the covenant to operate prudently, the term
"market" must be defined differently under different conditions,
with different requirements in each case for satisfaction. For
example, it is submitted that the Colorado courts would probably
be reluctant to declare that a lessee had been guilty of breach of
covenant to market, where the land was situated in "frontier or
wildcat" territory, without pipeline, rail, or truck facilities. An-
other important factor for consideration in defining the term "mar-
ket" is the nature of the product. Gas presents a problem of trans-
portation, requiring pressurized equipment, generally a pipeline,
and immediate shipment when taken from the ground. Oil, on the
other hand, may be stored and transported with much less hard-
ship. It should be said again that more often than not, the lease
will contain express provisions to cover these various situations.
The hardship of marketing gas is a good example in that most
instruments contain a "shut in" clause, which allows the lessee to
shut the gas in the formation until marketing facilities avail them-
selves. The lessee, in turn, pays rent to the lessor for this privi-
lege, at the same time enjoying immunity from litigation on the
implied covenant to market the product. This clause was not
meant to serve as a permanent shield against the implied covenant
however, and will become ineffective if it is shown that the lessee




Remedies for breach of implied covenant to market
the product promptly
The lessor may proceed on three theories:
A. If the lessee has discovered oil or gas within the time
limits of the primary term but has capped the well, the lessor may
proceed on the theory that the failure of production through cap-
ping subjects the interest to termination at the end of the primary
term, production in paying quantities being a condition precedent
to the continued existence of the lease.
12
B. The lessor may seek cancellation on the ground that the
failure to market the product evinces an intent to abandon the
incorporeal interest held by the lessee. This remedy depends, of
course, on the type interest which an oil and gas lease creates in
the particular jurisdiction.
3
C. The lessor may seek damages or cancellation.
14
V. To PROTECT THE PREMISES AGAINST SUBSTANTIAL DRAINAGE
This is perhaps the most litigated of all the covenants. Be-
cause of the fluidity of oil and gas and the likelihood of their being
withdrawn from the leased property by the operation of wells on
adjoining lands, the law implies a duty on the lessee to protect
the lessor's property by drilling protection wells to offset the drain-
age wells on adjacent property. The lessee is not obligated to pro-
tect against all drainage, however. The standard of conduct applied
by the courts is that of an ordinarily prudent person under similar
circumstances. The duty to offset arises only where it appears that
the offset well would yield to the lessee a profit after drilling and
operating expenses are deducted. Here again the court must de-
pend on the expert opinion of those in the industry in order to
determine whether or not a substantial quantity of oil is being
drained so as to impose a duty on the lessee to offset. In addition
to technical opinion, the conservation laws on spacing should be
considered. 5
Another interesting problem arises when the court considers
whether or not payment of delay rentals relieves the lessee of the
duty to protect against drainage. Although decisions have been
rendered both ways, the prevailing view relieves the lessee of this
duty on payment of rentals. This again applies only in absence
of "specific footage" or similar clauses.
'. Chaney v. Ohio and Indiana Oil Co., 32 Ind. App. 193, 69 N. E. 477.
"Beatty-Nickel Oil Co. v. Smethers, 49 Ind. App. 602, 96 N. E. 19.
"Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 P. 347.
1951 COLO. LAWS, ch. 230, p. 651.
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Remedies for breach of implied covenant to protect
against drainage
A. Damages
1. Burden of proof
The lessor must establish by a preponderance of evi-
dence that wells on adjacent property are causing sub-
stantial drainage, and that if an offset was drilled, it would
be sufficiently productive to yield a profit to the lessee
after payment of drilling and operating expenses, and roy-
alties to the lessor.
2. Measure of damages
The measure of damages to compensate for loss from
breach of covenant to protect against drainage is generally
the royalty which the lessor would have received had the
protective well been drilled, computed from the date the
well would have been drilled by an ordinarily prudent op-
erator, together with interest thereon.
B. Conditional decree of cancellation
In most drainage cases, damages are adequate. However a
conditional decree is available if the circumstances demand equity.
EXPERT OPINION ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
As indicated previously, the major problem confronting the
lawyer in this type of litigation, lies, not in establishing liability,
but rather in proving the damages. The question of damages al-
most invariably depends on the fact circumstance of each case. Fur-
ther, it is no defense to an action for damages for breach of an
implied covenant that the lessor depends on expert opinion to
establish his case.16 The day of obscure concepts that oil pools
were lakes of infinite size fed by rivers of oil which dashed from
place to place at will, is past. The courts now have a genuine re-
spect for the opinions of engineers and geologists. Neither will
the courts allow its normal policy of "stability through stare
decisis" to prevail over these opinions.
It might be interesting to take one of the more common situa-
tions arising under the implied covenant to protect against drain-
age, and determine how the lawyer may best prepare his case in
order to utilize the ability of the, engineer witness to the fullest
extent.
The situation referred to is that of the lessee who holds an oil
and gas lease to property on or near the edge of a field which has
been sufficiently exploited to define, approximately at least, the
outer limits of the producing pool. The lessor of course demands
protection wells to offset the wells drilled on the upstructure side
" Daughtee v. Ohio Oil C., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308.
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of his property. The lessee may feel that it would be an uneconomi-
cal risk to drill, claiming that the pool is an edge water drive
reservoir, having depleted past and interlimital boundaries of his
lease. The lessee almost always seeks delay, waiting for some other
"edge" lessee to drill and thus prove the field limits-and so, liti-
gation.
The following facts will be required for the cause of either
party:
1. Is the reservoir pressurized by gas in solution or from an ex-
ternal source such as a downstructure water drive, or an up-
structure gas cap in a dome or anticline.
2. Date of pool discovery and total production to date.
3. Porosity, permeability, thickness of producing sand, gas-oil
ratios, bottonhole pressures, gravity and other properties of
the gas and oil.
4. The conservation laws on spacing.
5. The time sequence of well development.
6. The cost of the wells.
THE LAWYER'S TASK
The lawyer's task now becomes one of furnishing the expert
witness with the necessary information in order that the witness
may best apply his ability in behalf of the cause at bar. This will
include area maps, exploitation time sequence maps, logs from both
the driller and the electric log service companies, core analyses,
and isopachous or formation thickness maps. The engineer will
then proceed as follows:
1. He will calculate the size of the pool, volume removed as pro-
duction to date, and the potential volume remaining in the
formation.
2. The exploitation maps will give him a record of producer wells,
dry holes, and producers which have become gas or salt water
wells.
3. The overall time sequence of the wells will show the source of
reservoir energy as well as an approximate chronological record
of the depleting pool boundaries.
4. The size of the pool and the production figures will aid in fur-
ther establishing the present pool limits.
5. The porosity, permeability, and gravity will help to establish
the tendency of the oil to migrate.
This approach to the problem would seem to indicate that the
engineer, given the right tools of information, can become an in-
valuable assets to the oil and gas lawyer. The end result of the
foregoing preparation, if done in good faith, is generally a case
supported by the best evidence available even though based on
technical opinion. And to repeat again, the courts are most will-
ing to shed obsolete decision based on conjecture and be schooled
in the modern version of this scientific industry.
DICTA
June, 1954
TAX ASPECTS OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
AND ALIMONY IN DIVORCE*
J. NELSON YOUNG f
In representing a client in a divorce settlement, an attorney
must be fully cognizant of the tax incidents of the financial ar-
rangements agreed upon by the parties or imposed by court decree.
Failure to consider the tax consequences may materially jeopard-
ize the financial benefits secured for the wife or substantially
increase the cost of the settlement assumed by the husband. It
is the scope of this paper to outline the principal tax factors to
be considered in consummating the financial settlement incident
to the divorce or separation.
At the outset, an example may serve to demonstrate the sub-
stantial burdens imposed upon the respective parties if the tax
consequences are overlooked.' Assume that a husband having
net taxable income of $16,000 is obligated to pay his divorced
wife $6,000 per year. If these payments are not taxable to the
wife, the husband obtains no deduction and his tax will total
$5,200 leaving a net income after taxes of $10,800. The wife, of
course, will enjoy the full benefit of the $6,000 and will not be com-
pelled to discount the amount received to allow for payment of
income taxes. On the other hand, if these payments are taxable
as alimony to the wife, her tax will approximate $1,048 and the
net amount available for her living expenses will be reduced ac-
cordingly. The husband, in this case, will gain a deduction in an
equivalent amount and his tax will be approximately half the
amount otherwise payable, namely, $2,640 rather than $5,200.
Anticipation of the tax costs by the attorney for either party may
result in shifting the tax incidents to avoid adverse tax conse-
quences to his client.
BACKGROUND OF PRESENT ALIMONY PROVISIONS
Our first concern in the tax problems of divorce is the treat-
ment of continuing payments made by the husband to the wife
which are in the nature of alimony. In an early case it was held
that alimony received by the divorced wife did not constitute tax-
able income within the statutory definition of the term, but rather
a non-deductible personal expense of the husband incurred in dis-
charging an obligation incident to the marriage relationship. 2
This was the state of the law until the Revenue Act of 1942 was
* Reprinted from the April, 1954, issue of the South Dakota Bar Journal.
j-Of Urbana; Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Chairman, ISBA
Section on Federal Taxation.
' The figures used in this illustration are approximate and are based on
1954 tax rates.
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917).
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adopted. Congress, motivated by the substantial increase in sur-
tax rates, deemed it inequitable to continue the established rule
regarding the treatment of alimony and determined that these
payments should thereafter be taxed as income of the wife and
allowed as a deduction to the husband. This was accomplished by
adding sections 22(k), 23(u) and 171 to the code and by amend-
ing section 22(b) (2) relating to insurance and annuities. Section
22(k) prescribes the conditions prerequisite to the taxation of
alimony payments as income of the wife. If the payments fall
within these statutory provisions, the husband is allowed a page 3
deduction by section 23(u).
The constitutionality of treating alimony as income under
the Sixteenth Amendment has been sustained in a recent decision.
In the Gould case,3 it had been assumed that the treatment of all
money as income was a matter of statutory definition and that
there were no constitutional limitations or restrictions. The Court
of Claims took this position in its recent decision and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
4
By the terms of the statute, alimony either as income or as a
deduction is placed strictly on a cash basis. The fact hat the tax-
payer regularly follows .the accrual method of reporting income
does not alter the situation-alimony payments are taxed only in
the year of receipt and are deductible only in the year of payment. '5
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
To qualify under the provisions of section 22(k) so that the
payments will be taxable as income of the wife and deductible as
a page 3 deduction by the husband, certain technical requirements
must be met. For convenience these are summarized as follows:
(1) there must be a decree of divorce or separation;
(2) the payments must be in satisfaction of an obligation im-
posed or incurred "because of the marital or family rela-
tionship;"
(3) the payments by the husband must be in discharge of an
obligation imposed by decree, or incurred "under a writ-
ten instrument incident to such divorce or separation;"
(4) the payments must be "periodic" and not installment
payments of a principal sum; and finally,
(5) the payments must not be for the support of minor chil-
dren.
It is also provided that periodic payments attributable to prop-
erty transferred on trust or otherwise shall be taxed to the wife
and excluded from the husband's income.
'Supra, note 2.4 Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. C1. 1950), cert. den. 339
U. S. 978 (1950).
'Int. Rev. Code, §§22(k), 23(u); Reg. 118, §39.22 (k)-1(a)(6) (1953).
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REQUIREMENT OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATION*
A prior decree of divorce or legal separation is the sine qua
non for treatment of periodic payments as alimony under the Code
provisions. In the absence of a prior decree, the payments made
by the husband will not qualify even though clearly intended for
the support of the wife. This requirement is strictly enforced by
the courts as evidenced by the following instances in which the
payments have been held to fall outside the provisions of the
statute.
(1) payments under a voluntary separation agreement;6
(1947).
(2) payments pursuant to court order enforcing a voluntary
separation agreement;7
(3) payments pursuant to court order enforcing the hus-
band's legal obligation to support his wife and family ;s
(4) payments of alimony pendente lite;9
(5) payments made prior to a decree even though subse-
quently covered by entry of a decree nunc pro tunc;10 and
(6) payments under an interlocutory decree.1'
In all these cases the decisions turned on the fact that there
had been no decree of divorce or legal separation prior to the time
the payments were made. It should be noted that where a quali-
fying decree of divorce or separation is lacking, the parties may
still file a joint return as husband and wife. 12 This was recently
permitted in a case where an interlocutory decree had not become
final prior to the end of the taxable year.
13
Anomalous as it may seem, universal validity is not required
of a prior decree. Thus it has been held that payments under a
separation agreement entered into prior to a foreign decree were
deductible by the husband even though the foreign divorce had
been held null and void by the domiciliary state.14 The Bureau has
* Section 71 of the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (H.R. 8300,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. would abolish the present requirement of a prior judicial
decree of divorce or separation. Support payments under a voluntary separa-
tion agreement would be treated as alimony taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband where the parties do not file a joint return.
6Smith v. Comm'r, 168 F. (2d) 446 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 6 T.C.M. 1323
'Terrell v. Comm'r, 179 F. (2d) 838 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U. S.
822 (1950).
6 Frank J. Kalchthaler, 7 T.C. 625 (1946); Angelo Frascone, 8 T.C.M. 377
(1949).
9 Reg. 118, §39.22 (k)-1, Example (1); George D. Wick, 7 T.C. 723 (1946),
aff'd per curiam, 161 F. (2d) 732 (3d Cir. 1947); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C.
916 (1951).
,0 Daine v. Comm'r, 168 F. (2d) 449 (2d Cir. 1948), affirming 9 T.C. 47 (1947).
"Alice H. Evans, 19 T.C. 1102 (1953).
12 Int. Rev. Code, §51(b) (5) (B).
13Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049 (1953).
14 Feinberg v. Comm'r, 198 F. (2d) 260 (3rd Cir. 1952), reversing, 16 T.C.
1485 (1951). Here the parties, residents of New York, entered into a voluntary
separation agreement which provided for weekly support payments to the wife.
A few weeks thereafter, the husband obtained a Florida divorce with service
by publication. Subsequently the wife obtained a reformat.'n -f the separation
agreement and a declaratory judgment that the Florida decree was null and void.
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also ruled that it will allow a deduction for payments made by the
husband under a separation agreement incident to a Mexican di-
vorce decree where the parties resided in a jurisdiction which did
not recognize such decrees. 15
OBLIGATION IMPOSED "BECAUSE OF THE MARITAL
OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP"
In adopting the alimony provisions, Congress studiously
avoided incorporation of the term "alimony" in the language of
the statute. As indicated in the committee reports, it was in-
tended that the statute should "produce uniformity in the treat-
ment of amounts paid in the nature of or in lieu of alimony re-
gardless of variance in the laws of different states concerning the
existence and continuance of an obligation to pay alimony." 
1
With this expression of legislative intent to rely upon, it has been
held that periodic payments for support are deductible by the
husband and taxable to the wife even though the law of the par-
ticular state does not impose upon the husband an obligation to
pay alimony.'
7
It is still necessary, however, to distinguish between payments
which are in satisfaction of property rights and those which are
in satisfaction of support rights. Payments in satisfaction of
property rights alone will not qualify as alimony payments-that
is, such payments will not be taxable as income of the wife, nor
deductible by the husband. More frequently, the agreement or de-
cree will provide for settlement of both property and support
rights in consideration of periodic payments. Unless the provi-
sions are clearly separable, periodic payments required of the hus-
band will nevertheless qualify as alimony taxable to the wife.
In a very recent case, the divorced wife claimed an interest as
a partner in her husband's business in the negotiations leading
to the divorce settlement. This claim was based upon the rendi-
tion of services in the operation of the business and an alleged
understanding that she was to be made a partner. In the settle-
ment concluded by the parties, the wife released her claim to an
interest in the business and waived her dower rights and claims
for alimony. The principal consideration for the release of these
rights was the husband's agreement to provide a home and an
automobile for her, the assignment of a 40% interest in some life
insurance policies, and the payment of $17,500 per year in equal
semi-monthly payments. The wife contended that the periodic pay-
ments were made as the purchase price of her ownership in the
business and should not be taxable to her. But the Tax Court con-
G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
16H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 72 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. Bull.
372, 427; Sen. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 83 (1942), 1942-2 Cum. Bull.
504, 568.
'" Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700 (1946); Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
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cluded that taking the agreement as a whole the periodic payments
were for support and were properly taxable.
18
OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY DECREE OR WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
Section 22(k) expressly provides that the husband's obliga-
tion to make periodic payments must be imposed by decree or by
a "written instrument incident to such divorce or separation." In
the vast majority of cases, this requirement presents no difficulty
for the husband's obligation is generally imposed either by the
specific terms of the decree or by the provisions of a written in-
strument incorporated in the decree. The real difficulty with re-
spect to this requirement arises either where the agreement is made
prior to the divorce or separation and is not incorporated in the
decree, or where the parties subsequent to the divorce or separa-
tion alter or amend the husband's obligation without the benefit
of court supervision.
Consider first the situation where an agreement for periodic
payments is entered into prior to the divorce or separation, but is
not incorporated in the decree. The Tax Court has adopted the
view that in such a case the agreement is not incident to the
divorce or separation unless the parties mutually contemplated or
intended a divorce at the time the agreement was consummated. 19
The Courts of Appeals, however, have not adhered to this restric-
tive rule of construction and have held that the statute does not
require proof "that both parties jointly and positively anticipated
legal divorce or separation at the moment they signed the agree-
ment." 20 Instead, these courts have taken a much more liberal
position and have adopted the rule that the agreement shall be
considered incident to the divorce or separation if the payments
thereunder take the place of alimony or support monies which
would otherwise be due and payable.
2-
A question also arises where an agreement has been incorpo-
rated in the decree but subsequent to the divorce or separation the
parties by mutual consent alter or amend the provisions for peri-
odic payments. The trend of the recent cases is that the revised
agreement will be considered incident to the divorce or separation
provided the original agreement meets this requirement. 2 The
moral of the cases in this area points toward the advisability of
incorporating a pre-divorce agreement in the decree and of effect-
ing subsequent revisions or amendments under the supervision of
Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953) ; see also on this point: Floyd H. Brown,
16 T.C. 623 (1951).
"9E.g., Francis Hamer Johnson, 21 T.C. No. 42 (1953).
Izrastzoff v. Comm'r, 193 F. (2d) 625, 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
21Lerner v. Comm'r, 195 F. (2d) 296 (2d Cir. 1952),. reversing, 15 T.C. 379
(1950); Comm'r v. Miller, 199 F. (2d) 597 (9th Cir. 1952), reversing 16 T.C.
1010 (1951).
22 Smith v. Comm'r, 192 F. (2d) 841 (1st Cir. 1951), affirming 16 T.C. 639
(1951); Rowena S. Barnum, 19 T.C. 401 (1952); cf., Comm'r v. Walsh, 183 F.
(2d) 803 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affirming, 11 T.C. 1093 (1948); Comm'r v. Murray,
174 F. (2d) 816 (2d Cir. 1949), reversing, 7 T.C.M. 365 (1948).
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the divorce court. This should be the modus operandi to insure a
tax deduction for the husband.
PAYMENTS MUST BE PERIODIC
Lump Sum Payments Do Not Qualify-It is the general
scheme of the statute that the payments must be periodic to qualify
as alimony. In most cases this requirement poses no problem for
it is generally provided by agreement or decree that the husband
shall pay the wife a fixed sum per month for her support until
her death or remarriage. In that case the payments are taxable
to the wife and deductible by the husband. But there are instances
where the husband pays a fixed sum to the wife in full satisfac-
tion of his obligations. A lump sum payment clearly does not
qualify under the statute and is neither taxable to the wife nor
deductible by the husband.
23
Installment Payments of a Lump Sum-To take another vari-
ation, assume that a principal sum is established as a basis for
settlement but it is provided that payment shall be by installments.
By an exception included in section 22(k), installment payments
may qualify as alimony if the payments of the principal sum ex-
tend over a period of more than ten years from the date of the
decree or agreement. But the amount which may qualify as ali-
mony in any one year may not exceed ten per cent of the principal
obligation. From the husband's standpoint, installment payments
of a principal sum extending over a period of more than ten years
will prove advantageous since such payments will qualify as proper
tax deductions.
The statute provides that the ten year period shall be measured
from the date of the decree or instrument. In drafting an agree-
ment or decree where it is intended that the payments shall qualify
under the statutory exception, care should be taken to avoid skat-
ing too closely to the edge of the ten year period. 24
Rule of Separability and the Drafting Problem-A recent case
demonstrates the tax trap which awaits the draftsman under the
rule of separability which has been applied to agreements which
provide for installment payments. 25 The point can best be made
by illustration: Assume an agreement or decree which provides
in separate clauses substantially as follows:
(A) H shall pay W $25,000 in semi-annual installments of
$2500 for a period of five years beginning January 1,
1954; and
(B) in addition, H shall pay W $5,000 per year in equal
monthly installments for a period of 15 years beginning
January 1, 1954.
As noted later, a lump sum settlement may result in gift tax liability.
4E.g., see: Comm'r v. Blum, 187 F. (2d) 177 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. den.
342 U. S. 819 (1951).
'Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax. Rep. 9616, (3d Cir.
November 13, 1953).
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The total obligation of the husband is to pay the divorced wife
$100,000 over a period of 15 years-$25,000 under clause (A) and
$75,000 under clause (B). Combining the payments under the
two clauses $10,000 is payable each year during the first five years
and $5,000 during each of the last ten years of the fifteen year
period. The payments of $10,000 per year do not exceed ten per
cent of the total obligation of the husband. But under the rule of
separability, the payments required under clause (A) will not
qualify under section 22(k) since these payments constitute in-
stallment payments of a principal sum due within a period of less
than ten years. Consequently, the husband will lose a tax deduc-
tion of $25,000. By careful draftsmanship, this result can be
avoided.
To obviate the adverse result in the foregoing case, the hus-
band's obligation should be stated in terms of a single principal
sum as follows:
(a) H shall pay W $100,000 over a period of 15 years begin-
ning January 1, 1954, in the following installments: (1)
$10,000 per year for the first five years; and (2) $5,000
per year for the last ten years.
By merging the husband's obligation into a single principal sum,
the rule of separability will be inapplicable and the payments
made during the first five years will qualify as alimony deductions
since they do not exceed ten per cent of the principal amount.
The foregoing suggestions are directed toward proper repre-
sentation of the husband. One representing the wife would, of
course, prefer the first form of separately stating the husband's
obligations since that would serve to remove $25,000 from the
wife's taxable income.
Payments for Periods Less Than Ten Years Contingent Upon
Death or Remarriage-As indicated above, installment payments
of a lump sum extending over a period of less than ten years do
not qualify as alimony payments under section 22 (k). It has been
contended, however, that if the payments are contingent upon
death or remarriage, they are periodic and are not installment
payments of a lump sum since the period is indefinite. The Tax
Court has consistently refused to bow to this argument and has
held that where the payments are for a fixed period of less than
ten years, though subject to these contingencies, they constitute
installment payments of a readily determinable fixed sum.
2-"
In two recent cases, however, the Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Third Circuits have held that the probability of re-
marriage is so uncertain and immeasurable that it serves to convert
the fixed term into an indefinite term and the payments become
"J. B. Steinel, 10 T.C. 409 (1948); Frank P. Orsatti Estate, 12 T.C. 188
(1949); Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949); Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308
(1950); Benjamin Davidson, 11 T.C.M. 1111 (1952); F. Ellsworth Baker, 17 T.C.
1610 (1952), rev'd, 205 F. (2d) 369 (2d Cir. 1953).
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periodic payments taxable to the wife and deductible by the hus-
band.27 In the light of these decisions, specified payments over a
fixed term of less than ten years qualify as alimony if the pay-
ments cease upon the wife's remarriage.
The decision of the Third Circuit in the Smith case is broad
enough to sustain the proposition that payments contingent upon
the death of either the husband or wife will constitute periodic
payments. This position seems inconsistent with the usual recog-
nition given life expectancies in determining valuation. If the
life expectancies of the two parties are at least equal to the term
for which the payments are to be made, it is reasonable to conclude
that the payments constitute installment payments of a fixed sum.
Further developments on this point-either judicial or legislative
-- can be expected.
Payments Contingent Upon the Husband's Earnings-Where
the payments for a term of less than ten years are contingent upon
the husband's earnings, the decisions are not consistent in the
treatment of such payments as periodic rather than as installment
payments of a principal sum. 28 One may, with reasonable safety,
postulate the rule, however, that if the payments to the wife vary
directly with the husband's income, the payments will be consid-
ered periodic. Assume, in a situation where the husband's earn-
ings are normally subject to considerable fluctuation, the wife is
to receive 30% of the husband's net income for a period of eight
years-but not less than $3,000 nor more than $6,000 per year.
Payments under an arrangement of this type should qualify as
periodic payments.
PAYMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN
By express provision in section 22(k), payments made for the
support of minor children are not deductible by the husband nor
taxable to the wife. This result clearly follows where the agree-
ment or decree expressly stipulates that a certain amount is pay-
able for support of children. 29 But where the decree or agreement
fixes a sum for support of both the wife and children without spe-
cifying the amount for each, the payments are taxable in their
entirety to the wife and are fully deductible by the husband.3
Under these circumstances, no portion of the husband's payments
may be treated as payments for the support of a child in determin-
ing the dependency credit.31 Consequently the benefit of the de-
pendency credit is made available to the wife.
Although the agreement or decree may not designate a specific
sum for support of minor children, provisions for adjustment of
11Baker v. Comm'r, 206 F. (2d) 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Estate of Frank C.
Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616, (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 1953).
2Roland K. Young, 10 T.C. 724 (1948); John H. Lee, 10 T.C. 834 (1948);
James M. Fidler, 20 T.C. No. 149 (1953).
"Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(d) (1953).
"oDora H. Moitoret, 7 T.C. 640 (1946).
"Int. Rev. Code, §25(b) (3).
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the payments to be made to the wife may result in identification
of a portion of the payments as being for that purpose. To illus-
trate, assume that the wife is to receive $500 per month for the
support of herself and a minor child. Without more, the $500 is
taxable as income of the wife and is deductible by the husband as
alimony. But assume that there is a further proviso that upon
the child's reaching majority or in the event of the child's prior
death the monthly payments shall be reduced by $100. This latter
provision has the effect of identifying $100 per month as payments
for the support of the minor child.3 2 Thus the wife would be taxed
upon income of $400 per month and the husband's deduction would
be limited accordingly.
Although the husband is allowed no deduction for payments
for the support of minor children, he may be allowed a dependency
credit. The burden is upon him, however, to establish that he con-
tributed more than one-half of the support of the child or chil-
dren.3 3 This burden is a difficult one where the payments are made
to the wife who is not bound to separately account for the expendi-
ture of the funds. Where the situation is sufficiently amicable, the
wife might be persuaded to create a separate bank account so that
a detailed report of expenditure of the funds for the support of
the children will be maintained.
ALIMONY TRUSTS
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, income of an alimony trust
was taxable to the husband if it discharged, but did not terminate,
a continuing obligation to support the former wife.34 Under the
provisions of Section 22(k), the distributable income of a trust
created pursuant to decree or an agreement incident to the divorce
or separation is taxable to the wife and excluded from the hus-
band's income. If there is a provision for payment of an annuity
to the wife, the full amount is taxable to the wife as a periodic
payment even though the distribution is in part from corpus. 35
There are instances where the husband has created a trust for
the benefit of his wife prior to the time a divorce was contemplated.
The income of this trust may have been taxable to the husband
because it was required by the terms thereof that the income
should be distributed for the support and maintenance of his wife
(section 167), or because he retained a power of revocation (sec-
tion 166), or because he retained such powers as to bring the trust
within the scope of the Clifford doctrine (section 22(a)). In a
subsequent divorce or separation, the wife, relying upon the ben-
. The following decisions illustrate this point: Robert W. Budd, 7 T.C. 413
(1946), aff'd per curiam, 177 F. (2d) 198 (6th Cir. 1947); Leon Mandel, 8 T.C.M.
445 (1949), aff'd 185 F. (2d) 50 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C.
1308 (1950).
33Richard P. Prickett, 18 T.C. 872 (1952).
" E.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
"Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(b) (2) (1953). The annuity payments in this case




efits provided by the previously created trust, does not seek or
obtain provision for her support in the legal proceedings incident
to the divorce or separation. Under section 171, the income of the
trust will thereafter be taxed to the wife, but distributions from
principal will not constitute taxable income.
36
Consistent with the rule applicable to periodic payments by
the husband, trust income applied to the support of minor chil-
dren is taxable to the husband, not to the wife.3 7 But where the
trust income includes tax-exempt interest, the husband is entitled
to a pro-rata allocation in the determination of his taxable income. 38
As will be noted later, gift tax liability may be incurred upon
creation of an alimony trust. In addition, the trust property may
also be included in the husband's gross estate upon his death if
he retains an interest in the property or control over its ultimate
disposition.
ANNUITY IN PAYMENT OF ALIMONY
Where the wife desires support payments for the duration of
her life, a simple solution would be for the husband to purchase
an annuity contract and assign it to her. But if this were done,
the husband obtains no tax deduction for the consideration paid
for the annuity. He is deemed to have made either a lump sum
payment or, more properly, a transfer of property to provide peri-
odic payments for the wife. The wife, on the other hand, will be
fully taxed upon the annuity payments as periodic payments at-
tributable to property transferred in satisfaction of the husband's
obligation. The three per cent rule generally applicable to annui-
ties is inapplicable in this case by express statutory exception. 3"
The same result would follow if the husband assigned to the wife
an annuity limited by his own life.
The tax cost of employing an annuity can be reduced, however,
by altering the form of the settlement. Assume that the wife de-
sires an annuity of $3,000 per year which will cost $50,000. If the
husband purchases the annuity contract and assigns it to her, the
annual payments of $3,000 will be fully taxable to the wife. But
assume that the wife accepts a payment of $50,000 from the hus-
band in satisfaction of his obligation to support her. Later she
purchases an annuity with the funds provided. In this case, the
wife will be taxed each year only upon $1,500 (3% of $50,000).
Where an annuity is desired, it would be preferable for the hus-
band and wife to arrive at a cash settlement and let the wife pur-
chase the annuity after the settlement has been effected. The
husband's tax position remains the same, but the wife's tax cost
is substantially reduced.
'Int. Rev. Code, §171(a); Reg. 118, §39.171-1 (1953).
'Int. Rev. Code, §§22(k), 171(a).
'Arthur Letts, Jr., 3 T.C.M. 377 (1944).





Life insurance may be an important factor in the financial
settlement effected by the husband and wife. These transactions
may take several alternative forms, but the more common prob-
ably fall into the following patterns:
(a) the husband transfers fully paid-up policies absolutely to
the wife; or
(b) he transfers annual premium policies to the wife and con-
tinues the premium payments; or
(c) he transfers annual premium policies to the wife who as-
sumes the burden of future premium payments.
These transactions present four problems which should be
considered at this point. (1) Does the husband obtain an income
tax deduction upon the transfer of insurance policies to the wife?
(2) Do the premium payments made by the husband subsequent
to the transfer constitute taxable income to the wife so that the
husband may take a corresponding deduction? (3) Are the pro-
ceeds of the policies received upon the husband's death taxable as
income of the wife? (4) Are the proceeds of the insurance policies
includible in the husband's gross estate for purposes of the Federal
estate tax? A gift tax question also arises with respect to the
transfer of the policies, but this point is covered in connection
with property settlements.
Transfer of Policies and Payment of Premiums-The transfer
of a partially paid or a fully paid-up policy to the wife will not
provide the husband with an alimony deduction since this consti-
tutes a lump sum payment or a transfer of property for the pur-
pose of providing the wife with periodic payments--depending
upon the settlement provisions of the contract. Conversely the
wife does not realize income upon the transfer of the policy.
Whether the premium payments made by the husband subse-
quent to the transfer are taxable as income of the wife and de-
ductible by him as alimony turns upon the nature of the wife's
interest in the policies. If she takes only a contingent or security
interest to protect her in the event of the husband's premature
death-for example, where the policies are payable to her only if
she survives her husband-the premiums are not taxable as ali-
mony income and the husband will not be allowed a deduction.
40
But if she takes an absolute property interest in the policies and
is free to change the beneficiary, borrow upon the policies, aad
surrender the policies for their cash surrender value, the premiums
are taxable to her as alimony income and are deductible by the
husband. 4 . The distinction rests upon the proposition that the
wife must actually or constructively receive the periodic payments
"Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616 (3d Cir. No-
vember 19, 1953); Seligmann v. Comm'r, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9580 (7th
Cir. October 19, 1953); Lilian Bond Smith, 21 T.C. No. 40 (1953); William J.
Gardner, 14 T.C. 1445 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 191 F. (2d) 857 (6th Cir. 1951).
OLemuel A. Carmichael, 14 T.C. 1356 (1950); Anita Quinby Stewart, 9
T.C. 195 (1947).
DICTA
made by the husband. Where her interest is merely a contingent
interest, this requirement is not met.
Proceeds of Insurance as Income of Wife-The income tax
treatment of the proceeds of life insurance contracts received by
the wife following the husband's death is uncertain. The language
of the regulations is sufficiently broad to indicate that if the pro-
ceeds are received in periodic (installment) payments, they are tax-
able to the wife as alimony income in any event.42 This result does
not seem unreasonable where the wife's interest under the policies
was security against her husband's premature death. In that case
the premiums paid by the husband would not have been taxable
to her and the policies would serve to continue periodic payments
for her after his death. But where the wife held an absolute prop-
erty interest in the policies prior to her husband's death so that
the premiums paid by the husband were taxable as alimony in-
come, the result is harsh indeed. In that case, no deduction would
be allowed against the proceeds for the amount of premiums taxed
to her as income.
The regulations imply that the proceeds may not be taxed as
income in any respect if paid in a lump sum. A question still re-
mains, however, as to whether the wife will be considered a trans-
feree for value so that she will be taxed upon the proceeds to the
extent that the amount received is in excess of her cost basis
where she took an absolute interest in the policies prior to his
death. There is considerable need for legislative clarification in
this area.
Inclusion of Proceeds in Husband's Estate-Proceeds of the
insurance policies will be included in the husband's gross estate
under the Federal estate tax in either of two situations. If the
proceeds serve to liquidate an obligation to continue alimony pay-
ments to his wife-for example, where the wife's interest is a
security interest-they are includible in the same manner as if
they were payable to the executor. But an off-setting deduction
may be taken as a claim against the husband's estate. 43 The pro-
ceeds are also includible in proportion to the premiums paid by
the husband where there was a transfer of the policy to the wife
in the divorce settlement and the transfer constituted a gift for
purposes of the gift tax.44
PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
Gift Tax Consequences-The first question to arise with re-
spect to a transfer of property or lump sum payment of cash in
a divorce settlement is the applicability of the gift tax. This turns
on whether the transfer is for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth. There is no specific provision in the
gift tax regarding the treatment of transfers made in considera-
'Reg. 118, §§39.22 (b) (2) -4; 39.22 (k) -1(b) (1) (1953).
SEstate of Silas Mason, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941).
"Int. Rev. Code, §811(g) (3).
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tion of the relinquishment of marital rights. But section 812 (b)
of the estate tax provides that relinquishment of "dower" or "other
marital rights in the decedent's property or estate" shall not be
treated as consideration in money or money's worth in determin-
ing allowable claims founded upon a promise or agreement. Ap-
plying the rule of pari materia, the Supreme Court has adopted
this restriction in construing section 1002 of the gift tax in the
determination of taxable inter vivos transfers of property in satis-
faction of a spouse's dower rights.
45
The rules now applicable to property settlements incident to
divorce or separation are these: (1) If a transfer is made pursu-
ant to an agreement not incorporated in a decree, there is a tax-
able gift to the extent that the transfer is made in satisfaction of
the wife's dower or other property rights.46 (2) If, however, the
transfer is made pursuant to decree or an agreement which has
been incorporated in a decree, there is no taxable gift regardless
of the purpose of the transfer. 47 A transfer in this case is deemed
to be one in satisfaction of a decretal obligation and is not made
pursuant to a promise or agreement. Consequently the require-
ment of an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth is not applicable.
The status of the law in this area leads to this conclusion. To
avoid imposition of a gift tax upon a property settlement, with-
hold transfer of the property until the settlement agreement has
been adopted by the divorce court and incorporated in the divorce
decree.
Income Tax Consequences-A transfer of property pursuant
to a property settlement may also result in the realization of tax-
able income by the husband. This will follow where the value of
the wife's property and support rights exceeds the cost basis of
the property transferred. 48 Assume for example that the wife has
agreed to accept $150,000 in full satisfaction of her property and
support rights and is willing to take securities held by her husband
which are currently valued at that figure. The cost basis of the
securities in his hands is only $50,000. The husband will realize
a taxable gain of $100,000 upon the transfer.
Subsequent to the settlement a question arises as to the cost
basis of the property acquired by the wife. Has she acquired the
property by gift so that she succeeds to her husband's basis, or
has she acquired the property by purchase? Although the trans-
action may have constituted a gift under the gift tax, it is deemed
a purchase and sale for income tax purposes. Consequently the
basis of the property in the wife's hands is its fair market value
Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308
(1945); Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
41 Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
48 Comm'r v. Halliwell, 131 F. (2d) 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. den., 319 U. S.
741 (1943) ; Comm'r v. Mesta, 123 F. (2d) 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. den., 316
U. S. 695 (1942).
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:at the date of the transfer or the amount of the liquidated obliga-
tion satisfied by the transfer.
49
INCOME TAXES UPON ALIMONY INCOME OF THE WIFE
The taxability of periodic payments to the wife is governed
by the conditions imposed under section 22(k). If the payments
do not meet these requirements, the wife's erroneous inclusion of
the amounts in her taxable income does not validate a deduction
taken by her husband. 50 Similarily, the wife's agreement or obli-
gation under a decree to pay income taxes upon payments received
from her husband does not render the payments taxable to her
or deductible by him if they do not qualify under section 22 (k). 1
Often it will be provided that the husband shall pay the in-
come taxes assessed with respect to the payments made to the wife
so that she will be guaranteed a tax-free income. This will not
serve to exclude the payments from her taxable income if they
are otherwise taxable under section 22 (k) .52 The additional amount
paid by the husband to defray the wife's income tax constitutes
additional taxable income of the wife.53 In a recent ruling the
Bureau has obviated the problem of a "tax on a tax on a tax" by
ruling that the amount agreed upon by the parties as payable by
the husband in liquidation of this obligation will determine the




Deduction of legal expenses incurred by the respective parties
in connection with divorce or separation and the financial arrange-
ments incident thereto has caused considerable litigation. But by
this time the rules are fairly well established.
Paid by the Husband,-The husband may be obligated to pay
not only his own legal expenses, but also those of his wife. As a
general proposition, neither are deductible. Legal expenses in-
curred in obtaining a divorce or defending a divorce suit are per-
sonal expenses which are non-deductible under section 24(a) (1).
In recent cases it has been urged that the portion of the legal ex-
penses allocable to the financial settlement are deductible as non-
business expenses "incurred for the production or collection of
income." The Courts following the rationale of the Lykes case,,-,
40Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F. (2d) 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Edna W.
Gardner Trust, 20 T.C. No. 125 (1953) ; C. de Bourbon Patino, 13 T.C. 816 (1949),
aff'd, 186 F. (2d) 962 (4th Cir. 1950); Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
"Van Vlaanderen v. Comm'r, 175 F. (2d) 389 (3d Cir. 1949).
1 Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949).
"Muriel D. Neeman, 13 T.C. 397 (1949); aff'd per curiam, 200 F. (2d) 560
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. den., 345 U. S. 956 (1953).
"Mahana v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950), cert. den., 339
U. S. 978 (1950).
' Mim. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 8, as amended by IR-Mim. 51, 1953-2 Cum.
Bull. 65.
"Lykes v. United States, 343 U. S. 118 (1952) (denying a deduction under
section 23(a) (2) for legal expenses incurred in defending a gift tax deficiency).
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have rejected this argument and have disallowed the deduction on
the ground that the immediate purpose of the expenditures is to
relieve the taxpayer of liability and is not directly related to the
production or collection of income.5 6
In one case, however, the fact justified a contrary result. There
the husband was serving as president of a corporation in which
he held a controlling interest. His wife was negotiating for a
property settlement which would have required liquidation of his
stock and consequent relinquishment of control of the corporation,
loss of dividends, and probable loss of his position as president.
The court concluded that the legal expenses were allowable in these
circumstances as expenses incurred in "conserving and maintain-
ing property . . . for the production of income." 57
The wife's counsel fees which are paid by the husband are not
deductible by him as alimony payments. These expenses are not
in the nature of alimony and if they were such payments would
not qualify as periodic payments.5 8
Paid by the Wife-Legal expenses and counsel fees paid by
the wife are accorded somewhat different treatment. To the ex-
tent that they are allocable to the negotiation or creation of tax-
able alimony income, they are deductible as non-business expenses
under section 23(a) (2), being held ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred in the production or collection of income.5 9 The
same rule previously mentioned applies, however, to fees and ex-
penses allocable to obtaining a divorce or defending a divorce suit.
These are non-deductible personal expenses of the wife.
ALIMONY IN KIND
Payment of alimony in kind is certainly not the ordinary situ-
ation. It is conceivable, however, that under certain circumstances
the husband may furnish groceries, clothing, or fuel to his di-
vorced wife. These items would ccnstitute payments in lieu of
money and would qualify as periodic alimony payments under the
statute.
It has been held, however, that the rental value of a home
furnished by the husband to the wife rent free does not provide
an alimony deduction.60 In the particular case the wife was granted
the right to live in the family home until her death or remarriage
or until the children reached the age of 23 or left home whichever
event was the first to occur. The court concluded that there were
no periodic payments by the husband as required by statute; or,
in the alternative, that if there were periodic payments, they were
" Howard v. Comm'r, 202 F. (2d) 28 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'g 16 T.C. 147
(1951); Estate of Frank C. Smith, 5 CCH 1953 Fed. Tax Rep. 9616 (3d Cir.
November 13, 1953).
"Baer v. Comm'r, 196 F. (2d) 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
3'Baer v. Comm'r, supra, note 57; Frank J. Loverin, 10 T.C. 406 (1948).
"Barbara B. Lemond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949); Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
6oPappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F. (2d) 428 (5th Cir. 1947).
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attributable to property transferred. The former is the preferable
view for it is unlikely that it was intended that the wife should be
taxed upon the rental value of the property in these circumstances.
ARREARAGES OF ALIMONY
Frequently, the husband will fall behind in his alimony pay-
ments and then liquidate the accrued amount by a lump sum pay-
ment. It has been held that such payments are to be treated as
periodic payments taxable to the wife and deductible by the hus-
band.6 1 This rule is also applicable to delinquent installments of
a principal sum payable over a period of more than ten years.
62
The ten percent rule is inapplicable in this case and the delinquent
and current installments will be taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband in the year payment is made.
CASE COMMENT
COMMENT ON SCONCE V. NEECE: FEES TAIL, THE
RULE IN WILD'S CASE, A SIXTEEN DOLLAR QUESTION,
AND SOME COPARCENERS.-Sconce v. Neece I construed this
language: "I give, devise and bequeath all my estate, real, per-
sonal and mixed, to my daughters, Katie S. Pence and Lulu S.
Middleton, and the heirs of their body, share and share alike, pro-
vided that, if either of my said daughters shall not be living at
the date of my death, without any children surviving her, then,
I give, devise and bequeath all my estate aforesaid to the survivor."
Both daughters survived the testatrix and neither had had a
child. This circumstance seemed to permit court and counsel to
simplify the problem of construction by ignoring the proviso, and
upon this basis, the court's application of Chapter 159, section 1,
'35 C.S.A. and Chapter 40, section 7, '35 C.S.A. is orthodox, and
as to the land, conclusive.
2
However, it is more usual for the intention of the testator to
be sought by an analysis of all the language in the will.3 What
would have been the result if the proviso had been considered? It
says, ". . . if either of my daughters shall not be living at the
date of my death, without any children surviving her . . ." The first
61 Gale v. Comm'r, 191 F. (2d) 79 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
2Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(c) (1) (1953).
16 Colo. Bar Assoc. Advance Sheets 271, 268 P. 2d 1102 (1954). The case is
not stated because it is assumed that the reader of this comment has read the
opinion.
' Anomalous section 47 of Chapter 40 says that "This article (including sec-
tion 7) shall not be so construed as to embrace last wills and testaments." This
observation was included in a comment on Liebhardt v. Avison, 28 Dicta 216.
Since that publication there has been an occasion to subject that comment to
careful review, but no occasion for any revision was found.
3 See, for example, Liebhardt v. Avison, 123 Colo. 338, 229 P. 2d 933 (1951).
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attributable to property transferred. The former is the preferable
view for it is unlikely that it was intended that the wife should be
taxed upon the rental value of the property in these circumstances.
ARREARAGES OF ALIMONY
Frequently, the husband will fall behind in his alimony pay-
ments and then liquidate the accrued amount by a lump sum pay-
ment. It has been held that such payments are to be treated as
periodic payments taxable to the wife and deductible by the hus-
band.6 1 This rule is also applicable to delinquent installments of
a principal sum payable over a period of more than ten years.
62
The ten percent rule is inapplicable in this case and the delinquent
and current installments will be taxable to the wife and deductible
by the husband in the year payment is made.
CASE COMMENT
COMMENT ON SCONCE V. NEECE: FEES TAIL, THE
RULE IN WILD'S CASE, A SIXTEEN DOLLAR QUESTION,
AND SOME COPARCENERS.-Sconce v. Neece I construed this
language: "I give, devise and bequeath all my estate, real, per-
sonal and mixed, to my daughters, Katie S. Pence and Lulu S.
Middleton, and the heirs of their body, share and share alike, pro-
vided that, if either of my said daughters shall not be living at
the date of my death, without any children surviving her, then,
I give, devise and bequeath all my estate aforesaid to the survivor."
Both daughters survived the testatrix and neither had had a
child. This circumstance seemed to permit court and counsel to
simplify the problem of construction by ignoring the proviso, and
upon this basis, the court's application of Chapter 159, section 1,
'35 C.S.A. and Chapter 40, section 7, '35 C.S.A. is orthodox, and
as to the land, conclusive.
2
However, it is more usual for the intention of the testator to
be sought by an analysis of all the language in the will.3 What
would have been the result if the proviso had been considered? It
says, ". . . if either of my daughters shall not be living at the
date of my death, without any children surviving her . . ." The first
61 Gale v. Comm'r, 191 F. (2d) 79 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming 13 T.C. 661 (1949).
2Reg. 118, §39.22(k)-1(c) (1) (1953).
16 Colo. Bar Assoc. Advance Sheets 271, 268 P. 2d 1102 (1954). The case is
not stated because it is assumed that the reader of this comment has read the
opinion.
' Anomalous section 47 of Chapter 40 says that "This article (including sec-
tion 7) shall not be so construed as to embrace last wills and testaments." This
observation was included in a comment on Liebhardt v. Avison, 28 Dicta 216.
Since that publication there has been an occasion to subject that comment to
careful review, but no occasion for any revision was found.
3 See, for example, Liebhardt v. Avison, 123 Colo. 338, 229 P. 2d 933 (1951).
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question is, "surviving her when?" At her death, or "at the date
of my death"? The next clause offers some indication that "sur-
viving her at the date of my death" is meant, because it says,
"... then I give, devise and bequeath . . .", and in that context
"then" would seem to refer to "the date of my death" rather than
to the death of a daughter during the lifetime of the testatrix.
Also, there would seem to be no be no purpose in making a gift
over dependent upon the sequence of the deaths of a daughter and
her children if they all died before the testatrix.
But even if this uncertainty as to the time of surviving is
resolved by construing the proviso to read, "if either of my said
daughters shall not be living at the time of my death, without any
children surviving her at the time of my death, then I give, devise
and bequeath all my estate aforesaid to the survivor", there is still
doubt as to the effect of the proviso. Nothing is expressly given to
children who might be surviving their mother at the date of the
death of the testatrix. Would they therefore take nothing, or would
a gift to them be read into the will by implication.
4
Or suppose that one of the daughters was not living at the
death of the testatrix and that at that date there was no surviving
child of such daughter, but that there was a surviving grandchild.
Would there be read into the will by implication a gift to that
grandchild, -even though "children" is usually construed to exclude
grandchildren? 5 There are cases in which "children" has been
held to mean "descendants" or "issue" or "heirs of the body";6
and there are likewise cases holding "heirs of the body" to mean
children."'7 In this will it would seem that the testatrix probably
used the terms interchangeably, and that they should both be
taken to mean "heirs of the body" or both be taken to mean
"children".
If the former meaning be adopted, the will then reads, "... to
my daughters . . . and the heirs of their body, share and share
alike, provided that, if either of my said daughters shall not be
living at the date of my death, without heirs of her body surviving
her at the date of my death, I give . . ." Such a construction
would confirm the court's reasoning and would make it possible
to imply a gift to surviving grandchildren (whether per capita or
per stirpes would be a matter for further implication), or the
words, "heirs of her body", which are normally words of limitation
rather than words of purchase, might be treated in the proviso
simply as surplusage, in which case the proviso would relate merely
to lapse, and there would be no gift by implication.
If the latter meaning be adopted, the will then reads, "... to
my daughters . .. . and their children, share and share alike, pro-
vided that, if either of my said daughters shall not be living at
"' Restatement of the Law of Property, section 272, comment (f).
11 161 A.L.R. Annotation, "Nature of estate created by grant or gift to one
and his children." 612, 614 (1946).
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the date of my death, without children surviving her at the date
of my death, then, I give . . ." In this form the meaning of the
proviso as one having to do merely with lapse, is plain, and there
is no need to consider supplementing the will by reading into it
gifts by implication. Nor would the testatrix's intention have to
be changed into something else by Chapter 40, section 7, or by
any other statute.
The attractive simplicity of this latter wording is deceptive.
It requires a consideration of the first resolution in Wild's Case,-
".. . and therefore this difference was resolved for good law, that
if A. devises his lands to B. and to his children or issues, and he
hath not any issue at the time of the devise, that the same is an
estate tail; for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain
that his children or issues should take, and as immediate devisees
they cannot take, because they are not in rerum natura, and by
way of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his intent,
for the gift is immediate..."
In this case the daughters had "not any issue at the time of
the devise". Therefore, under the first resolution in Wild's case
they would have taken estates in fee tail at common law. And so
the circle of legalisms is completed, the same result is reached, a
fee tail in the daughters, whether the proviso be ignored or con-
strued in the way now under consideration. But the proviso was
a part of the will, and it was before the court as one of the facts
in the case, and it would seem proper therefore to consider the
decision as one that comes close, at least, to an application of the
first resolution in Wild's case, even though it was not mentioned
in the opinion.
It may be objected that it is absurd to construe "heirs of their
body" in this will to mean "children", and then to apply the first
resolution in Wild's case to change "children" back into "heirs of
the body". The answer is that the apparently absurd result is due
not to the method of construction, but to the circumstances of the
case. Under other circumstances, the second resolution in Wild's
case would have been applicable: ". . . but if a man devises land
to A. and to his children or issue, and they then have issue of their
bodies, there his express intent may take effect, according to the
rule of the common law, and no manifest and certain intent ap-
pears in the will to the contrary. And therefore in such case,
they shall have but a joint estate for life . . ." (Under our statutes
A and his children would not take a joint estate for life, but rather
as tenants in common in fee simple.) Under such other circum-
stances the legalisms would not have gone in a circle back to a
fee tail at common law.
It has been stated above that the court's construction of Chap-
ter 40, section 7, '35 C.S.A. is orthodox and conclusive as to the
'6 Coke's Reports 16b, 17a, (1599).
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land, but it is not so as, to Susan A. Soper's personal propertyY
The court was evidently aware of this, for the last paragraph of
the opinion states, "While this opinion has been written in the
language of real-property law, the conclusions of our Court apply
with equal force to both the real and personal property . . ." It
will be noted that the court says that its "conclusions", not its
"reasons" apply with equal force to both real and personal prop-
erty. What reasons should have been applied to the personality?
Obviously Chapter 40, section 7, does not apply because it relates
only to "lands, tenements, and hereditaments". Nor could there
be at common law, an estate in fee tail in personality. The language
which would have created an estate in fee tail in land, created in
personalty a complete interest analogous to an estate in fee simple
in land. 10
Would such reasoning have changed the outcome of the case?
No, as the court said, its conclusions would have been the same,
because upon the death of the testatrix, her daughter, Katie S.
Pence acquired a complete interest in the personalty, and upon
her death it passed as intestate property to her administrator
and then to Lulu S. Middleton, and upon her death it passed to
her executor. It should be remarked, however, that these different
lines of reasoning, applicable respectively to land and to personalty,
would, under other circumstances, lead to decisively different con-
clusions, and that it might mean more than sixteen dollars.
Perhaps a few more comments or quibbles may be justified.
In the course of its opinion rejecting the contention that an estate
in fee simple conditional had been created, the court says, "It is
almost inconceivable that Susan A Soper, when she made her will
in the year 1911, intended to create an estate of a type which was
abolished by the Statute De Donis more than six hundred years
ago . . ." What if she had so intended? What if she had expressly
declared it to be her intention to create in each of her daughters
an estate in fee simple conditional? It might be inferred from
this quotation that her intention would prevail, and yet in answer
to the question, "Should the interest in land, known in the old
common law of England as an estate in fee simple conditional be
recognized in this jurisdiction?", the court said, "The question is
answered in the negative." In other words, Susan A Soper's in-
tention should, in this matter, have been treated as entirely
irrelevant.
There is another sentence in the opinion from which some ques-
tionable inferences might be drawn. In speaking of the reversion
left in the heirs of the testatrix the court says that it ". . . was
9 The answer brief of the defendants in error states, "Insofar as the personal
property is concerned, although it does not appear in the record, there was ready
to be introduced into evidence, the inventory in the Estate of Susan A. Soper
which showed as personal property the sum of approximately $16.00 in a bank
account, and nothing else."
30 161 A.L.R., supra, 615.
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vested in the two daughters as tenants in common, and was trans-
ferable or subject to intestate succession in all respects as other
vested interests in property." What about the transferability of
interests that are not vested? The inference is that they are in-
alienable, as at common law, in spite of the general terms of
Chapter 40, section 1, '35 C.S.A. ("any interest in real estate
whatever"), Chapter 176, section 1, '35 C.S.A. ("any real estate
or property having the nature of legal character of real estate, or
personal estate"), and section 36 of the same chapter ("any or
all the estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion or
remainder").
Also it may be noted that when, in the above quoted sentence
the court says, "as tenants in common", it has overlooked the
language of Chapter 176, section 1, '35 C.S.A., which says, " .. .
shall descend .. . in parcenary . . ." Why quibble? The difference
might be decisive in another case. If devisees seem to take by
will as tenants in common the same estates in quantity and quality
which they would have inherited as tenants in common, then the
doctrine of worthier title applies, and they take not by the wifl,
but by inheritance, which might be of importance in the marshall-
ing of the assets of an insolvent estate, or in the distribution of
the intestate property of an adopted child. But if those who take
by inheritance, take in parcenary, as the statute says they do,
then the doctrine of worthier title cannot apply to testamentary
gifts to tenants in common, because even though the estates which
they take under the will may be the same in quantity as those
which they would have inherited, they are not of the same quality,
because of the difference in the kind of tenancy."
And finally, lest the authority of the law dictionaries be
shaken, it may be worth noticing, just as a matter of nomencla-
ture, that while at common law, daughters were merely "heirs
presumptive" because a son might be born, under our statute
daughters should be called "heirs apparent" because there can be
no nearer heir. T.G.M.
" Harper and Heckel, "The Doctrine of Worthier Title", 24 Ill. L. Rev. 627,-
639. (1930).
A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ -------------------- to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
DICTA
Back of Colorado Real Estate Investment Since 1898
'Prescription for
a healthy practice ..
k- , AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS
AMERICAN LAW REPORTS
A. L. R. PERMANENT DIGEST
U. S. REPORTS
Daily Use: Regularly During Practice Hours
BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY
Lawbook Publishers Since 1856
McALLISTER & HYDE STS. SAN FRANCISCO 1, CALIF.
HAVE YOU PAID YOUR DUES?
